and what happens when it shrinks back again. Whereas most studies tend to explore long distance politics from the 'long distance' perspective, I try to explore them from the receiving end as well. I try to see the political field from both these angles in order to overcome the bias that many diaspora studies have of only seeing things from the 'outside'. I discuss the mutual influence of home and exile and the quest for political citizenship inside and outside the territory of the nation-state. Furthermore, I explore how the recent shift in Burundi from conflict to post-conflict affects the political field inside and outside the country. As the gravity of the political field shifts back into the territory of the nation-state, the diaspora has to reinvent itself and redefine its raison d'être..
In order to answer these questions I will compare a historical analysis of the political conflicts in Burundi with multi-sited ethnographies of transnational politics, carried out in Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya and Belgium from 1997 to 2005. In this manner, I will compare changes in political subjectivities in the diaspora with changes in the political field at home and explore the mutual influence. 
Conceptualizing the transnational political field
When I first started fieldwork in a refugee camp in Western Tanzania in 1997-1998, it soon became clear to me that politics was a central preoccupation of the Burundian Hutu there and an organizing -at times violent -principle in the camp (Turner 1998; Turner 2001) . Furthermore, it became apparent that the camp was not an isolated unity;
worldviews and opinions among the refugees were shaped by party politics and deeply imbued in the political and armed conflict in their home country. It also became evident to me that the political entrepreneurs (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991) in the camp were involved in much larger networks spanning from Belgium and Denmark to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and to cadres inside Burundi itself. This led me to follow these networksdoing fieldwork in Denmark, Belgium, Bujumbura and Nairobi from 2002 to 2004 -and onto the track of theories of transnationalism and diaspora.
The work in the early 1990s by Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton is often accredited with launching the concept (and theory, some would claim) of transnationalism and the idea that people live lives across borders, belonging to more that one nation-state at once (Basch, Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994) , claiming to be a theory that could 'transnational political field' (Adamson 2002) ? Is a weekly phone call to a relative enough to qualify as a 'transmigrant', even though one works, rests and plays in only one place (Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec 2003) ? In order to overcome this dilemma, Itzigsohn et al distinguish between 'broad' and 'narrow' transnational practices (Itzigsohn, Cabral, Medina, and Vazquez 1999) , while others operate with 'core' and 'expanded' transnationalism (Levitt 2001a )(see also Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b) ).
Rather than attempt the impossible task to define and refine concepts, I am trying to explore not only that politics crosses borders, nor why it does so or to which degree.
What I find interesting, is how they do so and how the fact that they are transnational affects politics in Burundi. 2 It is not enough, I find, to categorize this or that political activity as either narrow or broad, core or expanded transnationalism. We need to move beyond concept definitions and explore the dynamics of the transnational political field and it affects and is affected by the politics of the Burundian state.
Inspired by Bourdieu (1991) I define the political field as a 'game' where politicians gain a 'practical sense' of the game and learn how to comply with the unwritten rules of the political field. By becoming competent players of the game, political entrepreneurs also reproduce it. In a dialectical manner, the political field determines what can and cannot be debated and fought over while at the same time the field is itself defined by these (Adamson 2002, 159) . Hence, the transnational political field is created as a terrain upon which various political actors attempt to discredit each other and claim to be the true representatives of 'the Burundian people'. What is interesting about the transnational political field as opposed to other political fields, however, is that it cuts across several political entities that grant citizenship and rights and that claim sovereignty.
Likewise, the fact that it is political, distinguishes it from other transnational practices, because politics is exactly about citizenship, belonging and sovereign power; all terms that are linked to nation-states.
The literature on transnationalism has long been eager to emphasizes that we are not approaching a post-national era, as the first theories of transnationalism -allegedlyclaimed (Jackson, Crang, and Dwyer 2004; Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec 2003; Willis, Yeoh, and Fakhiri 2004) . However, as Rainer Bauböck convincingly argues:
(T)hat political transnationalism is more than political activity across borders and also refers to these changing and increasingly overlapping boundaries of membership in political communities. (Bauböck 2003, 703) In this sense, transmigrants have several places of belonging -in terms of livelihoods, rights and belonging -and transnational politics oscillates between these levels as it transgresses national borders. Belonging to a nation -whether inside its territory or from afar -is, however, not merely a question of citizenship and rights. It relies on a 'supplement'; on emotional ties to the Patria, the Motherland, 'the soil' (Anderson 1991; Balibar 1991) . We may deconstruct the 'national order of things' (Malkki 1992), and reveal 'methodological nationalism' for what it is, but the fact remains that the illusion of people-place-identity is as strong as ever (Gupta and Ferguson 1997) . In fact, the whole concept of transnationalism implicitly relies on the assumption that migrants want to engage in their country of origin, or at least feel obliged to do so, despite the fact that they have all the citizenship rights they need in their new country of residence. 3 In order to understand this aspect of transnationalism, I turn to the concept of diaspora.
We have witnessed a shift in the use of the term diaspora over the past years with more and more groups being termed 'diasporas'. 4 It might be argued that due to this inflation in F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y 7 the use of the term, it has lost its original analytical value and must therefore either be abandoned or at least narrowed back down again (Safran 1991). However, I believealong with scholars like Kleist and Axel -that we must take the emic notion of diaspora seriously and perceive it more as a process and an aspiration than as a sociological fact.
As Kleist (Kleist 2007) points out, the term is moving rapidly from academia to policymakers and to migrant groups themselves, who use the term to claim recognition.
Whether or not we objectively can define the Somalis, the Sikhs or the Tutsi as a diaspora is beside the point. The point is that it has become a powerful concept in identity formation, the struggle for recognition, and claims-making. As Glenn Bowmann demonstrates in relation to the Palestinian diaspora, the term becomes an 'empty signifier' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) that is so open and vaguely defined that it is able to encompass all the troubles and tribulations of a diverse, dispersed and heterogeneous population (Bowman 1994). In fact, there need not even be a homeland from which the diaspora is dispersed, for there to be a 'diasporic imaginary' as Brian Keith Axel has argued in relation to the Sikh diaspora (Axel 2004) . The diaspora becomes a means of identification that retrospectively creates the lost homeland. In Lacanian terms, identity formation, or rather subjectivation, is always built up around a presumed original loss (Zizek 1989) . Ideology promises to bring back what was lost and heal the individual and 'the community', removing the antagonisms of society (Laclau and Zac 1994) . In this sense, creating a migrant community relies on referring back to something lost; the homeland (in Lacanian terms 'l'objét petit a'). This does not need to be a real homeland that was actually lost. Rather it is construed retrospectively as a stand in for a presumed original loss. It is the return of the homeland (which is not the same as the return to the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 However, without this lost homeland, the community could not stick together. Without the 'glue' of loss, the differences in objective interests would surface and 'the community' would seize to exists and simply become an assembly of individuals from the same country. I propose therefore to see diaspora less as a noun -something to be found and verified 'out there' -and more as an adjective -diaporic -or a verb -to diasporise. To be diasporic is to aspire to being part of a community, centered on a loss.
Similarly, to diasporise expresses an active process, resembling Kleist's proposal to perceive diaspora as 'becoming' rather than 'being' (Kleist 2007).
In sum, I argue that diaspora politics is both about longing and about claiming political rights. Being constituted around loss, exodus and exclusion, diaspora is closely linked to longing for a lost home. But it also produces political subjectivities, I argue, that revolve around exclusion from the polis at home and hence are about claiming rights to political inclusion and hence political citizenship. By exploring the shifting political field inside Burundi and how this affects the broader transnational field, I hope to shed light on the relationship between political citizenship (both in the sense of rights and in the sense of belonging) and the formation of diasporic identities.
These theoretical thoughts lead to the following methodological approach. Firstly, I
concentrate on the mutual relationship between political transnationalism and the nature of politics of inclusion and exclusion in the sending society. The political field in Burundi 
Waves of exclusion -the genesis of a diaspora
Depending on the ups and downs of the conflicts in Burundi, the political field extends beyond the national borders of the territory of the state. On the one hand, political violence in Burundi forced Burundians to live abroad, while on the other hand, refugees and emigrants engaged in 'long distance politics' 5 , trying to influence the political situation at home in various ways. In the camps in Tanzania they trained young men and sent them across the border to fight, while the elite in Europe had the financial means and the freedom of speech to function as spokespersons of their party in relation to the 'international community'. They lobbied host societies in a manner of ways, from approaching national politicians to performing dances at cultural events and informing school children about their country and its problems. In order to understand firstly how various diaspora groups emerged and secondly how they have changed, we need to explore the shifting political field in Burundi, exposing the dialectic relationship between the political situation in Burundi and the role of the diaspora.
Burundi is said to be comprised of three ethnic groups; the Hutu (85%), the Tutsi (14%) and a small group of marginalised Twa (1%). The figures may not be exact and there is doubt whether one can actually talk of ethnic groups rather than casts or classes (Chrétien 1990; Lemarchand 1996) . However, the groups are 'real' in the sense that hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in Burundi in the name of ethnicity. The Tutsi were privileged during first German and later Belgian rule, and were perceived by the colonial administrators as a race of rulers while the Hutu were considered by the Europeans to be By far the largest number of Hutu, however, fled across the borders to neighbouring countries. In Rwanda, a 'Hutu regime' was in place, welcoming their fellow Hutu, and allowing many to attend school and university there. The less fortunate ended up in camps in Tanzania where these non-educated people who had not been involved in politics and who had not previously identified themselves with ethnic labels, became Following the violence in 1993, Hutu guerrilla movements appeared in early 1994.
According to several reliable accounts, the rebellion started spontaneously in several parts of the country. Only later did the overall leadership, which was made up of Frodebu leaders in neighbouring countries, take over the command of the rebellion. This was a rather tumultuous period in Burundi's history where new lines of conflict emerged on top of the ethnic conflict, as various rebel movements appeared and disappeared, at times record. This in turn produced a more mixed diaspora, opposing the regime at home for different reasons.
The deteriorating security situation also resulted in a deteriorating economy (Ndikumana 2000; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000) . Peasants no longer planted crops for fear of having to leave before harvest or of having it stolen by rebels or government forces. The only economy that flourished was the contraband economy, run by the political and military oligarchy (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999) . This situation of economic stagnation meant that also a number of young Tutsi began leaving the country and seeking asylum in Europe and North America. This group of young Tutsi and a similar group of young, urban, elite Hutu blurred the borderline between refugees and economic migrants. They were less radical politically and in general less interested in politics altogether. Rather than directing their frustrations into political projects, they were adventurers seeking individual success. In this way we might question whether they were part of the diaspora at all. The Hutu and Tutsi who managed in the following years to get to Belgium and other European and North American countries, joined the small Hutu diaspora that had been in exile since 1972 as well as a number of Hutu and Tutsi who had been sent to 1980s by a number of Hutu post graduate students who were in Belgium on government grants. At first there was mutual suspicion between them, as the old refugees were convinced that these Hutu were 'turncoats' at best and spies for the regime at worst. One of these students from that era tells me how he had almost expected the exiled politicians in Belgium to have horns from the incredible stories he had heard about them. With the reforms in the early nineties some Hutu returned from neighbouring countries as did a few from Europe, and the political field moved back into Burundi where a lively debate was taking place.
Many remained in exile, however, sceptical of the process. These people were unfortunately proven right by the events, following the assassination of the president. Exclusion from the polis inside the country -the fact that Hutu were effectively denied political citizenship in Burundi, was essential to the emergence of a political diaspora in Belgium as it was in Tanzania. From outside the territory of Burundi this diaspora could make claims to citizenship rights, politicising the diaspora to the degree that even traditional drumming was linked to political factions within the diaspora. The political fault lines among Burundians in Belgium coincide to a large degree with time of arrival, stressing the point that the shape of the political field inside Burundi at the time of can maintain the illusion that they still play an important part in Burundi's political field.
They do not accept the fact that the political field has moved back inside the territory of the state and left them in limbo.
Depending on where they are in the diaspora, Burundians have reacted very differently to the shrinking of the transnational political field. The refugees in camps in Tanzania have worried about their security and have only returned once the hilltops in Burundi were safe and once the Tanzanian authorities had made life too hard for them in the camps. Nairobi was once a regional 'hub' of political activity; the junction between the refugee camps and the elite in Europe. Many opposition politicians were based there, and it was in Nairobi that meetings were arranged, arms deals were sealed, and plans conceived.
Everyone came through Nairobi on their way from A to B. Now most of the politicians have returned to good positions in the Burundian government. The Burundians that I encountered in Nairobi in May 2004 were mostly young men -and quite a few young women -living clandestinely in Kawangware and Sattelite, a fairly new, semi-rural, very poor part of Nairobi. They had virtually no income and lived with the constant threat of being stopped by the police and having to give a bribe or going to jail. Their strong Pentecostal belief helped guide them and keep their spirits high while it functioned as a way of keeping discipline, helping them stay away from sex, alcohol and gambling.
Although they help each other like brothers through the hard times, their projects were This is because in spite of Nairobi being a tough place to live, they were well aware that life would also be tough on them in Burundi. And they feared for their lives in Burundi because young Hutu men who have been in exile are often considered rebels or génocidaires by those who remained. And most of these boys had been involved in the rebellion one way or another before becoming born again Christians. In sum, Nairobi has been depoliticised; the important politicians have mostly returned, the young men who used to live in the camps and be part of the rebellion have turned to God and most of those who arrive now, are looking for adventure and personal fortune in East Africa's metropolis.
In Belgium, Burundians are similarly faced with the dilemmas of a depolicised transnational space, although the contexts produce different personal dilemmas. Given the present peace process, a few of the Hutu in Europe have returned to Burundi to 'help build the nation' as they would put it. Many of these had been active exile politicians and were offered positions in the new administration. The majority, however, have chosen to stay in Europe for the time being. At political meetings they would criticise the Hutu leadership in Burundi for giving in to the Tutsi, and they would claim that the Tutsi could still take power in a military coup as they had done before. In fact they believed that the Tutsi still held power because they controlled the army. In private conversations, people's choices to stay or go were more complex and involved a number of human factors. A middle aged man and his wife who both are unemployed -in spite of him having a Ph.D. There is in other words, a difference between the private choices people make and the public reasons given for staying in Belgium in spite of political reforms in Burundi. This is due to the fact that everything is politicised in diaspora, and very choice has to be related to political strategies -just like the cultural groups or the commemorations.
Rather than say that they remain here because they have a nice house or for their children's sake, they claim that the Hutu who have returned either are on the payroll of the Tutsi or are too naïve to see that they are being tricked. In this manner, they manage 
Bujumbura-the pragmatics of real politics
In English language school system, and they don't want her to have to do the last year in the French system in Bujumbura.
In spite of the pragmatic circumstances around choosing to return, they see their choice as part of a heroic deed -a duty that History has given them. This opinion was backed up by the other members of the national assembly that had returned from exile that I systematically interviewed in June-July 2003. They have to return to help rebuild their country -whatever the personal costs. In their discourse they are in other words sacrificing themselves for the common good -running the risk of being killed, having to live with armed guards all the time, and living separated from their closest family.
When talking about the politicians in Europe, they agree that they are very radical and uncompromising. 'It is easy just to criticise when you are sitting comfortably in Belgium,' they say. Belgium is perceived to be the worst place for in-fighting and radical politics, because it is so closely linked to Burundi. Nahimana says 'to live in Belgum is like living in Burundi.' That is why he chose Holland. In other words, it seems to have brought all the divisions from Burundi with it but not the imperative to negotiate. 'But here we have to find solutions. We must compromise. That is what politics is about. You cannot achieve anything without compromise.' In the words of Butasi who puts the blame on 'democracy and liberty': 'In Belgium you can say whatever you want without it having consequences -neither for your security nor for political decisions. Here things are more delicate. Here, you have a big responsibility. Your words have consequences.
So you have to compromise.' He goes on to explain that politicians here are 'partenaires' The political leadership in Bujumbura is well aware of the power of the diaspora -to which many of them used to belong -and the president and other high ranking politicians regularly meet the diaspora in Europe in an attempt to have a dialogue and 'soften' them.
This picture of the reconciliatory politics in Bujumbura is not all glossy, however.
Several Tutsi groups -such as Action Contre Génocide, PA Amasekanye, and a faction of Uprona -see the returning Hutu politicians as génocidaires who planned a genocide against the Tutsi in 1993. From another perspective, Hutu politicians who remained in the country during 'the problems,' find that the returnees are taking all the limelight. They feel that they struggled and suffered most, while the leaders in Europe had an easy life where they did not risk being jailed or killed for their opinions. Now the exiles have come back and taken all the attention due to their good connections, while those who suffered the most are not acknowledged.
In sum, there are many perspectives on the role of exiles, stayees and returnees respectively, depending on which angle one sees them from. The difficult personal choices in relation to a transition period which could result in peace and prosperity but 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
The mutual relationship between inside and outside
This paper has attempted to illustrate the continuous and complex relationships between homeland and diaspora. The diaspora has had an enormous influence on the political process in Burundi, altough it is impossible to measure such influence, as it covers a whole range of factors that cannot be quantified. The most tangible influence is, obviously, the armed rebellion, using bases in Congo and Tanzania 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The influence that internet sites, based in diaspora, might have on public opinion abroad and at home is even more elusive. There is no doubt, however, that the diaspora is detrimental to the survival of these sites. When, for instance, agora.com was banned in Burundi in 2002 because it allegedly incited ethnic hatred, a Tutsi in Denmark decided to host it in Denmark.
There are influences the other way as well. As we have seen in the historical overview, changes in the political field inside Burundi have forced the diaspora to redefine itself according to the hegemonic political discourse inside Burundi. In the 1980s Palipehutu gained strength, vindicating a discourse of ethno-national liberation. This was defined in an antagonistic relation to the dominant discourse of the one party state, which claimed that ethnicity did not exist. With the reforms in the early nineties, however, the regime partially accepted the idea of ethnicity, rendering Palipehutu without a cause. In stead a group of young intellectual Hutu who had studied in Rwanda set the agenda as moderates, calling for democracy rather than liberation. Similar changes are taking place presently.
With former rebel leader, Pierre Nkurunziza, as democratically elected president, the Hutu diaspora is in disarray. Meanwhile a Tutsi diaspora is emerging, gradually shifting from a number of individuals in Europe and North America to a more political diaspora. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The question is whether it makes sense at all to talk about the homeland affecting the diaspora and vice versa. With a diaspora so dispersed, living in very different conditions -from refugee camps to clandestine lives in Nairobi to doctors in Belgium -and so politically split, the affects are bound to be equally divergent. Perhaps it is more fruitful to think of it as a single political field that happens to be spread, geographically, over several continents; a transnational political field. There are thus discrepancies in opinions but everyone engages in the same field -which is a central point of Bourdieu's concept of the political field. It is through these struggles that the field is created. 
Conclusion: a transnational political field in flux or dissolution?
Once people leave Burundian soil, they do not necessarily leave Burundi. On the contrary, during periods of political exclusion, it was necessary for the political opposition to leave the territory in order to enter the political field. This raises important questions about sense excluded from such full rights but then again those who fled did so because they did not enjoy full political citizenship in the first place. I have argued that a political diaspora emerged due to exclusion from the national political citizenry. They organized politically and thus shifted the point of gravity of the political field outside the national borders.
In the case of the Burundian diaspora of the 1970s and 80s, they were making claims to citizenship in/through exile. When excluded from the political field in Burundi -de facto loosing citizenship -they moved to Belgium and elsewhere to claim their rights as citizens. However, citizenship always contains two dimensions, on the one hand claims to certain rights, on the other hand, it always includes an aspect of belonging. This has been the central tenet of the nation-state -always connected by the hyphen, making rights to the state and belonging to the nation inextricably locked together, albeit in a state of tension.
There are two important theoretical conclusions to be drawn from this. Firstly, the two aspects of citizenship have their (negative) equivalents in diaspora -with citizenship being what diaspora lacks. Secondly, the shifts in the point of gravity in Burundi's transnational political field lead to shifts in the nature of the diaspora as identity politics takes over where claims making lets go. When the first wave of Hutu arrived in exile in the 1970s and 1980s, a strongly politicized diaspora emerged due to the political system in Burundi. This first cohort remained effectively outside political influence and hence could indulge in radical identity politics without any connections to real-politics. We must remember, however, that their position -however radical it may appear today -was in fact very realistic at the time. Given the nature of the political field in Burundi at the time, a Hutu nationalist discourse was the only viable alternative to the one party state's dominant ideology.
Exiles were politicized in both senses (claims making and longing), and their political opinions were determined by the nature of the political field at the time. In the 1990s, the political field was less bipolar and less split between inside and outside the country. Inside and outside merged and the point of gravity moved to the outside. In this period, the diaspora was heavily politicized but more engaged in claims making than in identity politics. In recent years, the point of gravity has gradually shifted back inside, and those left in exile have no more claims to make on the state. So they remain in exile with their 'longing'. In the post-conflict situation, they need no longer make claims to rights from abroad. They are granted full political citizenship inside Burundi. However, 'longing' remains for those who remain in exile -for whatever reasons. They are involved in identity politics while excluding themselves from real politics. Politique Africaine, vol ?, no ?, pp. 182-90 CLIFFORD, JAMES 1994 'Diasporas', Cultural Anthropology, vol. 9, no. ?, pp. 302-38 COHEN, ROBIN 1997 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Ndikumana 1998, p 33) , I have argued elsewhere that we must comprehend these apparent double standards as part of a larger anti-colonial ideology (Turner 2001 (Turner , 2005 . 7 For a detailed analysis, see Lemarchand and Martin (1974) . 8 This is based on reading his manifesto and on numerous interviews with Burundians of all political observations. Of particular value were interviews with his co-founders in Belgium and Denmark, Joseph 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 See also Turner (1998 Turner ( , 2001 ) for a critique of her work. 10 For an analysis of these various 'cohorts', see Turner (2007a).
11 For a thorough analysis of these factions, see Turner (2007a) . 12 In Brussels and in Antwerp I have been to bars where I was the only white person, everyone else being from the Great Lakes region. However, Hutu and Tutsi would rarely frequent the same places. 13 The main contenders in the election were CNDD-FDD and Frodebu, which had previously been by far the largest 'Hutu' party in the country and had won a landslide victory in the previous elections in 1993.
Thus, for the first time, political competition was between Hutu rather than between Hutu and Tutsi. 14 Exploring contemporary politics in Burundi is like exploring a moving target. When research was initiated, Burundi was still engulfed in a bloody civil war. When much of the fieldwork for this article was gathered, the country was in the process of implementing a transition process. At the time of writing, the political landscaped has transformed dramatically once more, creating new conspiracy theories, new lines of tension and a new public political imagination. 15 For issues of conspiracy and secrecy in Burundian politics, see also Turner (2005 Turner ( , 2007b . 16 Most of the refugees in Europe, whether Hutu or Tutsi are from the elite and are used to comfortable lives with servants at home. 17 Pseudonym. Given the small size of the Burundian elite where 'tout le monde se connait', I have also changed other details in the life stories. 18 It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the various groups in Europe and North America.
However, it seems that the Burundian diaspora is more politicized in Belgium than anywhere else. In Denmark, for instance, interaction between Hutu and Tutsi is much more common. Many Burundians say that going to Belgium is like not leaving the country, in the sense that the conflict follows you. In other countries it is easier to make a new beginning. While the diaspora is less politicized and more concerned with being successful in the host societies in USA and Canada, it is still divided along ethnic lines. Thus, Tutsi tend to settle in New Jersey while Hutu settle inside New York. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
